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Abstract 
Data-centric storage wireless sensor networks in general provide in-network node repositories to keep sensory data for 
later use. However, most of previous studies pay less attention to data security issues, so that the sensory data could be 
easily explored to the intruders. The pDCS scheme although has implemented with data protection mechanism, it incurs a 
lot of rekeying message traffics while a node was compromised, and thus greatly consumes network energy. In this paper, 
based on the Exclusion Basis System (EBS), we propose an efficient and distributed key management protocol, termed as 
ERP-DCS, to improve pDCS’s deficiency. Through extensive simulations, we conclude that: at a slight increase on the 
number of keys (about one more key) stored in each node, the proposed scheme can achieve about 70% reduction on 
rekeying message overheads, and thus elongates the network lifetime. 
 
© 2013. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer review under responsibility of Information Engineering Research Institute 
 
Keywords: Key Management; Exclusion Basis System; Data-Centric Storage; Rekeying; Wireless Sensor Networks; 
1. Introduction 
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) usually consists of a large number of energy-constrained, wireless-
capable sensor nodes. Traditionally, the sensor nodes always report their sensing data back to a remote 
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processing center (called as the Base Station (BS)) in a client/server model [1][2]. In this model, the nodes 
would quickly run out their energies, and thus substantially shorten the network lifetime. This problem has led 
to the development of Data-Centric Storage (DCS) in a network [3][4]. We call such network as DCS sensor 
network (abbrev. as DCSN). 
In DCSNs, when a sensor node detects an event, it first sends its sensing data to a specific node for storing. 
The storage location is usually determined by the mappings of event attributes [3][4][5]. After that, the end 
user, if necessary, can acquire his desired information from that location, by applying the same mapping rules. 
Although this data collection mechanism is superior to the flooding approach, in terms of energy consumption, 
since the sensory data might be kept in the network for a long time, they can be easily explored to malicious 
attackers. As a result, data security issue should be considered with DCSN framework designs. Most of 
previous DCSN-related architectures have not developed such data protection mechanism. Even the pDCS [6] 
scheme has implemented, it incurs a lot of rekeying message overheads while a node was compromised. In 
this paper, based on the Exclusion Basis System (EBS)[8][9], we thus propose an efficient key management 
scheme for DCSNs, named as ERP-DCS (Efficient Rekeying Protocol for DCS sensor networks), to improve 
pDCS’s deficiency. Simulation results demonstrate that: the ERP-DCS scheme can reduce a large number of 
rekeying message overheads (about 70%), at a slight increase (about 2.3%) on the number of keys stored in a 
node, as comparing to the pDCS scheme. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review some related work in Section 2, and detail 
our proposed scheme in Section 3. In Sections 4, we conduct simulation comparisons on the key storage and 
rekeying message overheads for our proposed ERP-DCS and pDCS schemes. The conclusion remarks are 
finally drawn in the last section. 
2. Related work 
Before detailing our proposed ERP-DCS protocol, we first briefly review some key management schemes 
used in WSNs. And then point out the shortcoming of pDCS [6] scheme, which motivates this research. 
2.1 Key management schemes used in WSNs 
Some key management schemes frequently used in WSNs are listed below: 
<1>. Shared key scheme: A common key shared by some specific nodes are pre-loaded into node’s 
memories for future secure communications. This scheme although can ensure the full connectivity of 
network, the security defense might be thoroughly destroyed while attackers crack any node in the network. 
<2>. Pairwise key scheme: Any two-node pair shares a distinct key to communicate. Although this scheme 
can prevent the corruption of whole network while a node was compromised, the key storage overhead 
required by each node will be raised with the increase of node density, and thus has a poor scalability. 
<3>. Group-based key scheme: This scheme is usually employed in a cluster- or grid-based network 
architecture. With this scheme, several different keys applied to various transmission patterns (e.g. broadcast, 
multicast, or unicast) are assigned to each group member [7]. 
<4>. Exclusion Basis System (EBS): EBS seemingly is an issue dealing with set elements allocation, it in 
fact is a good rekeying mechanism. For the philosophy of EBS, the interested readers are referred to [8][9]. 
Table 1 exemplifies a simple EBS key management system. It can be interpreted as follows: suppose that a 
WSN consists of n=6 nodes, and 4(=k+m) distinct keys will be uniquely distributed to all nodes. Each node Ni 
contains only k=2 keys. In other words, Ni does not possess the other m keys. In such scenario, while a node, 
say N2, was compromised, the Key Distribution Center (KDC) (e.g. the BS or the Cluster Head) can 
independently send m=2 update messages encrypted with the exceptional keys (K2 and K4) to renew the 
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invalid keys (K1 and K3). The benefit comes from EBS mechanism is that: an EBS-based KDC can not only 
effectively revoke a compromised member, but it can also significantly trade off the overheads between the 
key storage k of each node and rekeying message m [8][9].  




N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
K1 1 1 1 - - - 
K2 1 - - 1 1 - 
K3 - 1 - 1 - 1 
K4 - - 1 - 1 1 
Table 2. The keys stored in each node with pDCS scheme 
Key type Definition 
Master A unique key shared by BS and a specific node. 
Pairwise Keys shared by a node and its neighbor nodes. 
Cell key A key shared by all nodes within the same cell. 
Row key A key used by all nodes locating on the same row. 
Group key The key shared by all nodes (including the BS) in the 
network. It is also known as the global key. 
 
2.2  Security issues with DCSNs 
pDCS (Privacy-enhanced Data-Centric Sensor network) [6] is the first study focusing on DCSN data 
security issue. In pDCS scheme, the sensing area is divided into several rectangles called as cells or clusters. 
In which, each sensor is loaded with many distinct keys used for different communication patterns. Table 2 
summaries the keys stored in each node and their definitions. The execution steps of pDCS scheme are 
delineated as follows: 
Step-1: Determine the storage location for the sensory data: While an event is detected by a sensor node 
locating in a cell (i, j), the node first determines its storage cell via hash mapping functions. 
Step-2: Data propagation: Afterward, the sensory data will be encrypted with the cell key K(i, j), and sent to 
the target cell to store, via the routing protocol like GPSR [10]. During each transmission step, the node-to-
node data packet is always secured by the respective pairwise key. 
Step-3: Data retrieval: If an end user wants to acquire his desired event information, he can also figure out 
the storage cell location for the event data by applying the same mapping rules. 
Although the pDCS has implemented a key management mechanism similar to that in the LEAP [7] 
scheme for easily conducting their group communications, it incurs a lot of update message overheads in 
rekeying phase. For instance, in a 4*4 cell-based sensing area, assuming a node Sc locating in the cell (2, 3) 
was compromised, the BS must perform the following rekeying operations. 
(i) Renew the global key for all nodes locating on the rows 0, 1, and 3. 
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(ii) Renew the global key and row key for all nodes locating on the row 2, except the nodes of the cell (2, 
3). 
(iii) Individually renew the global key, the row key, and the cell key for all nodes locating in the cell (2, 3) 
except the compromised node Sc. 
Based on the above descriptions, we argue that the pDCS scheme will incur a large amount of message 
traffics while rekeying. We thus apply the EBS mechanism to propose an improved rekeying protocol for 
pDCS scheme to substantially reduce its update message overheads. 
3. The proposed scheme 
Before detailing our proposed ERP-DCS scheme, we make some assumptions for our implementations. 
3.1 Assumptions 
(1)A homogeneous network: In addition to the BS, all nodes in the network are with the same resources 
and processing capability. 
(2)Cell-based clustering architecture: The sensing area is divided into several cells with the same size. 
Each cell can be deemed as a cluster, and in which a cluster head node (CH) serving as a KDC can be elected 
via a CH election algorithm such as described in [11]. 
(3)Location-aware: Every node knows its geographical location, so that it can figure out its cell ID. 
(4)There exists a sound intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect the compromised node. 
(5)There exists a short period of time to safely setup the desired keys [7]: no attackers can compromise any 
node during this period. 
3.2 The proposed ERP-DCS protocol 
Basically, the design philosophy of our proposed ERP-DCS scheme is similar to that in pDCS scheme, but 
two main dissimilarities should be emphasized. 1) In order to narrow down the rekeying areas, and thus 
reduce the number of rekeying messages, the ERP-DCS scheme removes the global and row keys from each 
node. 2) In contrast to the unicast applied to update the cell key in pDCS scheme, in ERP-DCS scheme, the 
CH of each cell builds an EBS key system and then distributes the respective EBS keys for its cluster 
members. By this way, as we will see in Section 3.3, the ERP-DCS protocol can broadcast a few update 
messages to renew all invalid keys. The simulation results will be illustrated in Section 4. Here we just 
describe its operational phases as follows: 
3.2.1 Key pre-distribution phase 
Before all nodes are deployed into the sensing area, the BS must pre-load some key materials into each 
node for generating other keys. These materials include: 
(i) A unique master key Ki shared with the BS for future secure communications. (ii) An initial key Kinit differing from the Ki, which will be used to generate the other keys in key setup 
phase. 
(iii) A one-way hash function H (.) used to generate the new keys and the storage location of event data. 
3.2.2 Key setup phase 
After the sensor nodes are deployed into the sensing area, we assume there exists a short time period to 
safely build up the following keys for further communications. 
(i) Pairwise keys: Each two neighboring nodes individually decide a common key as their pairwise key. 
This task can be achieved via some key pre-distribution schemes. 
(ii) Cell key: With the cell ID, every node can figure out its cell key via the hash function K(i, j)=H (Kinit, i 
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| j). 
(iii) EBS keys: The CH in each cell generates its EBS key matrix, and individually distributes the 
corresponding key set to all member nodes. 
For preventing the leakage of key materials, after completed all keys setup, the initial key Kinit will be 
deleted from node’s memory. Finally, all CHs send its EBS key allocation information to the BS for later CH 
rekeying purpose. 
3.2.3 Running phase 
Since the execution phase performed in our proposed scheme is similar to that in the pDCS scheme (as 
described in Sec. 2.2), we do not state it again. Here we only point out the main difference (occurring in the 
rekeying phase) between these two schemes. 
3.3 Rekeying phase 
Since there are two kinds of sensor nodes (the normal nodes and the CH nodes) could be compromised in 
our proposed ERP-DCS scheme, we thus discuss the rekeying processes for these two cases. 
3.3.1  Rekeying process for compromised normal node 
In proposed ERP-DCS scheme, the keys owned by a normal node include a master key, a cell key, pairwise 
keys and EBS keys. By the characteristics of EBS system, the CH just only broadcasts m rekeying messages 
to notify all other nodes to update. Of course, the update messages must contain the revoked node ID and all 
replacing keys, and be encrypted with the EBS keys that the compromised node does not have. 
3.3.2  Rekeying process for compromised cluster head 
Since the CH in each cell serves as a KDC, while a CH was compromised, not only the keys (i.e. master 
key, cell key, and pairwise keys) the CH privately owns, but also the EBS keys the other member nodes hold 
are all exposed. In this situation, the following rekeying procedures must be initiated from the BS. 
(i) The BS first individually sends a message that contains the captured node’s ID, the new cell key, and 
a flag indicating a CH election algorithm must be re-executed to each other nodes in the fallen cell. This 
message is always encrypted with the respective master key of each node. 
(ii) Every node (except the CH) receiving such packet must quickly replace its invalid cell key. 
(iii) After obtained the new cell key, the node broadcasts a CH-election message, which is encrypted with 
the new cell key, to all other nodes for contending the new CH. 
(iv) The new CH then creates a new EBS key system, and respectively distributes the corresponding key 
sets to all its member nodes. Consequently, the compromised CH node can be removed from the network. 
4  Simulations 
To validate the practicality for our proposed ERP-DCS scheme, in this section, we conduct several 
extensive simulations and compare the performance metrics for both ERP-DCS and pDCS schemes, in terms 
of key storage and rekeying message overheads. We assume N (N= 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000) sensor nodes 
are randomly scattered over a 500m x 500m, 20 x 20-cell sensing field. We also assume the node transmission 
range is fixed at 40m, and m = 2 messages are used for EBS keys update in the proposed ERP-DCS scheme. 
Fig. 1 shows the real key storage overheads, averaged from 200 execution runs, needed by both schemes. 
From this figure, we observe that, in all scenarios, the key storage overhead incurred by our proposed ERP-
DCS scheme is slightly higher (about one more key) than that in the pDCS scheme. Fig. 2 demonstrates the 
number of rekeying messages generated by both schemes while a node was compromised. The results are also 
averaged from 200 execution runs. From that figure, we conclude that the proposed ERP-DCS scheme can 
significantly reduce the rekeying message overhead (about 70%), comparing to the pDCS scheme. 
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5  . Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an efficient EBS-based key management scheme, termed as the ERP-DCS 
scheme, for data-centric storage sensor networks. By this scheme, the rekeying message overheads can be 
greatly reduced, and thus achieve energy conservation, while a sensor node was compromised. Extensive 
simulation results show that our proposed scheme can significantly reduce the number of rekeying messages, 
at a slight increased on the key storage overhead of each node, as comparing to existing counterpart pDCS 
scheme. 
 
Fig.1 The comparison of key storage overheads between ERP-DCS and pDCS schemes 
 
Fig.2 The comparison of rekeying messages generated by ERP-DCS and pDCS schemes 
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